Who decides about change and restructuring in organizations? by Kieron J. Meagher & Andrew Wait
  
 
The Australian National University 
Centre for Economic Policy Research 
DISCUSSION PAPER 
 
 
 
 
Who Decides about Change and Restructuring in 
Organizations? 
 
 
 
Kieron Meagher* and Andrew Wait† 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 587 
September 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN: 1442-8636 
ISBN: 978 1 921262 63 0 
*School of Economics, University of New South Wales, and Economics Program, RSSS, The Australian National 
University, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia, k.meagher@unsw.edu.au 
†Economics, University of Sydney, NSW 2006 Australia, a.wait@econ.usyd.edu.au 
 ii
 
 
Abstract 
 
We model the determinants of who makes decisions, the principal or an agent, when 
there are multiple decisions. Decision making takes effort and time; and, once 
implemented, the expected loss from a particular decision (or project) increases with 
the length of time since the last decision was made. The model shows delegation is 
more likely as: (i) controllable uncertainty increases; (ii) uncontrollable uncertainty 
decreases; (iii) the number of plants in the firm decreases; (iv) the complexity of the 
decision increases; and (v) the importance of the decision increases. The theoretical 
predictions are consistent with our novel empirical results on the delegation of major 
organizational change decisions using workplace data. Our unique data allows us to 
identify who made a decision to implement a significant change, as well as key 
internal and external factors highlighted as potentially important in our theory. 
Empirically, delegation is more likely in organizations that: face a competitive 
product market; export; have predictable product demand; have a larger workplace; 
and that have fewer other workplaces in the same organization producing a similar 
output. We find business strategy is not related to the allocation of decision making 
authority; delegation, however, is associated with the use of human resource 
techniques such as the provision of bonuses to employees. 
 
 
 
JEL Codes: D23, L23, L29 
Keywords: decision making authority, decentralization, delegation, competition, 
exports, uncertainty, principal and agent 
 
 
1 Introduction
In Sciences of the Artificial, Simon (1969) asserts that firm design can be analyzed independently
of the product market environment in which a firm operates and this approach has dominated
subsequent economic research in the area.1 The purpose of this paper is to show how both a
firm’s external and internal environments need to be considered in an optimal managerial design.
Focusing on delegation of authority, we derive theoretical results to advance this point and provide
new empirical evidence to support our claims.
Given the world is an ever changing place, a large part of the success of a firm is determined
by the effectiveness with which it makes decisions in response to changing conditions.2 There exists
a tradeoff between bringing more resources to bare on decision making via specialization through
delegation and the incentive conflicts inherent in agency. We model a dynamic environment in which
a boundedly rational principal must decided when to engage the service of an agent. The results
show how aspects of the external environment, likely to be affected by the intrinsic uncertainty
related to factors such as competition, globalization and demand fluctuations, play a critical role in
the delegation decision.
Previous studies on the optimal allocation of decision making rights have emphasized: providing
incentives to a subordinate (Aghion and Tirole (1997), Acemoglu et al. (2007), Zabojnik (2002)
and Bester (2004), for example); and strategic communication (Dessein, 2002). The team-theory
literature has emphasized complex-task design and endogenous organizational architecture (for ex-
ample, see the information processing literature including Radner (1993), Bolton and Dewatripont
(1994), Van Zandt (1999) and Meagher et al. (2003)). The focus here is somewhat different, although
complementary, to these previous studies. The model here focuses on the influence environmental
uncertainty has on an organization’s allocation of decision-making rights within an environment in
which the principal and the agent have differing objectives.3 Conceptually our approach also differs
from standard principal-agent models because organizational structure,4 and the specialization it
implies, are endogenous in our framework.5
Our results show how three factors are critical to the delegation decisions: (i) the rate at which
decisions become obsolete; (ii) the risk-incentive tradeoff under moral hazard; and (iii) economies of
scale in decision making. These three factors have been largely overlooked in the literature on dele-
gation. Obsolescence is almost universally believed to be an important organizational consideration
in the management literature (e.g. Stinchcombe (1990) and Brickley et al. (2007)) but has only been
seriously considered in economics with regard to hierarchy size (delayering) by Meagher et al. (2003,
2004). The original moral hazard approach to the principal agent relation placed great emphasis on
1See for example: Holmstrom (1979) and Hart and Grossman (1983) on the principal-agent problem; Grossman
and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) on the boundary of the firm; or Radner (1993), Van Zandt and Radner
(2001); Van Zandt (1999, 2004) and Garicano (2000) on communication and knowledge in firms.
2The Kaldor critique asserts that firm management (as opposed to mere supervision) requires a dynamic stochastic
setting otherwise all problems could be resolved in a set up phase by management in the choice some plan. All that
would be required thereafter is sufficient supervision to make sure the plan is implemented.
3Dynamic environments are modeled in Meagher et al. (2003) and Meagher et al. (2004) for single decision problems
in the absence of incentive conflicts.
4In the standard principal-agent framework the fact that the agent undertakes an action for the principal is given
(Holmstrom, 1979; Hart and Grossman, 1983), this is also true for the more recent models including delegation
(Prendergast, 2002)
5Although the activities modeled and our inclusion of incentive conflicts are quite different, conceptually our
approach shares much with Mount and Reiter (2002), Radner (1993), Van Zandt (2003) and Garicano (2000).
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risk-incentive trade-offs but took delegation to the agent as given. The more recent work by Pren-
dergast (2002) and Dessein (2002) on delegation focuses on uncertainty for the principal arising from
private information on the part of the agent that generates no risk for the agent themselves. Our
model can be thought of as reintroducing risk-incentive trade-offs into the contemporary delegation
literature in a frame work based on the information processing models. Finally the classical issue of
economies of scale has not been addressed previously because models have either assumed there is
only one decision or have made the essentially equivalent assumption that decisions are unrelated
(Aghion and Tirole, 1997).
Our empirical analysis is based on data on the delegation of organizational change decisions. The
sample covers plants from a broad range of industries giving substantial variety in external (product
market) conditions. Information on size and production arrangements for the firm, business strategy
and human resource management procedures is also included. The results of our cross sectional
analysis of delegation are consistent with our theoretical model and also highlight other important
factors in the decision making process.
This is the one of the first studies to examine the effect of product-market and international com-
petition on the decentralization of decision making. In a pertinent paper to this study, Colombo and
Delmastro (2004) investigated the relationship between the allocation of decision-making authority
and internal aspects of an organization’s structure using a survey of Italian manufacturing firms.
The other contemporaneous studies have each had a different and complementary focus. Acemoglu
et al. (2007) emphasized an establishment’s distance from the technological frontier. Empirically,
they focus on the choice of profit versus costs centers6. In an unpublished paper, for medium sized
manufacturing firms Bloom et al. (2007) construct a measure of decentralization based on influence
over operational decisions. They found product-market competition and trust were associated with
their measure of decentralization while the religious preferences of a region can be associated with
centralization. In another unpublished paper, Guadalupe and Wulf (2007) investigate the impact of
globalization on the number of layers between division managers and the CEO and the number of
positions directly reporting to the CEO.
Our empirical analysis offers something completely new. First, we have a direct measure of
the decision-making process that is not ineluctably captured by the aforementioned studies on the
profit/cost center choice or when examining how much influence parties have on operational de-
cisions. Second, there is no ambiguity about what is being measured with our decision-making
variable: the location of a unique decision maker on a specific type of change. Third, by examining
decision-making authority related to one significant non-routine change, we potentially avoid some
endogeneity problems that could arise with routine decisions; moreover, the decision to implement
a significant new project is precisely the type of decision examined in our theoretical model and,
indeed, in models styled on Aghion and Tirole (1997). Finally, we have an extremely rich data set
that covers all major industries (rather than just manufacturing firms), includes medium and large
firms and contains information on an array of firm and market characteristics.
In our model there are two types of decisions that need to be made: an external decision (such as
pricing strategies, development of new products or markets); and an internal decision (related to the
operation of the plant for example). The principal must decide whether to centralize both decisions
or whether to delegate one of the decisions to an agent. Given the ever-changing environment, a
6They also briefly consider delayering and decisions about employment.
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decision maker needs to expend effort (or put in time) to become informed about the decision(s) for
which they are responsible. There is also a cost of delay related to how long it takes to make each
of the decisions, reflecting that as the world changes the previously implemented decision becomes
increasingly outdated. The optimal choice for each action (decision) changes over time according to
a Brownian motion so that any action that is implemented can be expected to be further from the
optimal action, and hence have a larger cost, the greater the time that has elapsed since the decision
was made.
The principal faces the following choice — if she centralizes decision making and retains rights
for both the internal and external decisions — she will have to split her time between the external
and internal decision. As it will take her (relatively) longer to become informed about each separate
aspect of the organization, she will incur greater costs of delay from each decision to be made.
Alternatively, the principal could choose to delegate the internal decision to the agent, so that each
person can specialize in one type of decision. In this case the decision-making process is expedited
as each person focuses on just one decision. While the costs of delay are reduced, there is a cost of
delegation that takes, for example, the form of the additional cost associated with a standard moral
hazard incentive contract.
This trade off — higher delay costs versus an increase in agency costs — allows for several empir-
ically relevant predictions. First, an increase in controllable uncertainty, which can be ameliorated
by managerial resources, makes delegation more likely. Second, when systemic (uncontrollable) un-
certainty increases, delegation is less likely; as in the standard principal agent models increasing
exogenous uncertainty increases the agent’s expected remuneration, increasing the relative cost of
delegation while leaving the costs of centralization unchanged. Third, as the internal decision be-
comes more complex the principal is more likely to delegate the internal decision. Fourth, delegation
of the internal decision is more likely the larger the size of the business unit.
The predictions of the model are compared with the empirical findings of an analysis of decision
making in workplaces. We investigate the hierarchical level in an organization that made the decision
to implement a significant workplace innovation. The organization’s choice concerning the possible
decentralization of decision making is estimated as a function of product market and other firm
characteristics, such as size and the number of similar workplaces in an organization. Specifically,
the data set used (described in section 3) allows us to study the relationship between product market
competition and globalization on who makes decisions. Studying the decision to implement a non-
routine (potentially one-off) change reduces the scope for endogeneity between decision making
authority and the structure of an organization, which is likely to be designed with the firm’s day-
to-day operational requirements in mind (this type of endogeneity is a potential issue for other
studies).
We find that workplaces that face a competitive product market are more likely to delegate
decision making to the workplace, rather than to centralize the decision made to a higher level of the
organization. Similarly, workplaces that export their product are more likely to decentralize decision-
making rights.7 Delegation is more likely with larger workplaces; on the other hand, centralization of
the decision is more likely when there are other workplaces in the organization performing the same
task and when the product market is unpredictable. We also investigate the relationship between the
7It is important to note, of course, that while the results we find are consistent with the theory presented, we are
unable to imply any causal relationship with our data.
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allocation of decision-making authority and a workplace’s business strategy and the human resource
management techniques they adopt.
2 The Model
We develop a model below that addresses the key question: should the principal make all the
decisions herself or delegate a decision to the manager? Consider two players – a principal and a
manager. Two decisions need to be made, each on their own dimension: specifically, there is an
external environment denoted e and an internal environment i. On each of these two dimensions
circumstances change according to a Brownian motion, requiring the selection of an appropriate
project or response. Selecting the correct project requires the decision maker’s effort, and hence
their time.
2.1 Centralization of decision-making
First consider an organization in which the risk neutral principal makes both decisions. Decision-
making requires managerial resources which in this case is the constant instantaneous disutility of
work u for the principal. The required decisions are the choice of the values of each of the control
variable xjt , j = i, e corresponding to each of the Brownian motion state variables µ
j
t , j = i, e.
(σ2i > 0 and σ
2
e > 0 measure, respectively, the rate of change in the state µ
j
t , j = i, e of the internal
and external environments). Under centralized decision-making, with the principal making both
decisions, the loss function for the principal consists of quadratic-loss terms associated with each
of the Brownian motion control problems, the shock terms for each decision εjt , j = i, e, which are
distributed iid N(0, σ2ε), with σ
2
ε > 0, and the managerial resource cost u. The instantaneous loss
for the principal at t, denoted Lt is:
Lt = βi(xit − µit)2 + βe(xet − µet )2︸ ︷︷ ︸ + εit + εet︸ ︷︷ ︸ + u.
controllable uncontrollable
(1)
Where βj > 0, j = i, e are scale parameters for the importance of each control problem. We
normalize loss by dividing through by βe and relabel the normalized βi with β. The size of β is
driven by the value at stake, for example in practice β would tend to be larger the greater the scale
of the internal business unit being affected by the decision.
Note, for simplicity, there is no interaction between the two control problems in terms of the
optimal choices of the control variables. In line with standard principal agent models, this loss also
includes additive shock terms over which a decision maker has no control. This term is irrelevant
when considering optimal decisions but will be integral to the analysis of incentive contracts. We
term the two different types of uncertainty controllable (µjt , j = i, e) and uncontrollable (ε
j
t , j = i, e).
We now describe the resource costs associated with decision-making by the principal. Assume
plans (choice of control variables) are implemented perfectly with full information but that they
take time to formulate. That is, at the point in time when a decision is implemented it is possible
to ‘correctly’ choose the control variable to equal the state variable. However formulating a plan
takes time so the value of a control variable remains fixed until the next plan has been developed.
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In particular, a plan for environment j = i, e takes αjd(sj) > 0 units of time to formulate where sj
is the instantaneous share of attention allocated to this task. When a larger share of the principal’s
time is allocated to formulating a plan, that plan will be completed more quickly, thus d′ < 0.8
Alternatively if a task receives no attention it is never completed: d(0) =∞. We normalize the time
scale so that αe = 1 and the normalized αi is relabeled α. Here α > 0 reflects the difficulty of a task,
for example organizational change in a complex high-skill work environment may take longer than
in a simple low-skill environment. The principal’s attention/time constraint with no delegation is
si + se = 1.
The first step in constructing the principal’s expected loss (payoff) is to consider one control
problem in isolation. If a decision is being implemented every T units of time on environment j,
optimality requires xjt = µ
j
t for j = i, e. Our analysis will focus on the per-period loss in the steady
state which will, with out loss of generality, allow the time subscripts to be dropped from most
equations. Expected per-period loss in the steady state for environment j = i, e is9:
E[Lj ] =
1
T
∫ T
0
tσ2jdt (2)
=
σ2jT
2
. (3)
The only interaction between the two control problems is that both solutions draw upon the
principal’s common pool of attention/time. Substituting in the total attention constraint and netting
out the uncontrollable shock, which is independent of the shocks to the Brownian motions and has
an expected value of zero, gives the principal’s optimization problem as:
min
s
1
2
(d(s)σ2e + αβd(1− s)σ2i ) + u. (4)
Under appropriate conditions this optimization problem has a solution as outlined in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. If d(·) is strictly convex there exists a unique attention allocation s∗ ∈ (0, 1) that
minimizes the principal’s loss.
Proof. By the Wierstrass theorem a minimum exists and is unique due to strict convexity. The
optimum is an interior point since d(0) =∞.
The key issue for the principal is how the performance of this centralized management solution
varies with the environments. The result is captured in the following:
Proposition 2. The steady state optimal expected loss is strictly increasing in σi, σe, α and β.
Proof. By the envelope theorem.
As either of the environments changes more rapidly the principal may try to reallocate her
attention, but due to her fixed budget of time there must be some increase in loss. As the world
changes more quickly an individual of constrained cognitive ability will perform less and less well.
8Technically this is an information processing model with through-put but no delay. See Orbay (2002) and Meagher
et al. (2003) or for a survey Van Zandt (1998).
9Derivation of the loss starting from the Brownian motion is covered in Shreve (2004, Chapter 3).
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Variation in loss also occurs across firms depending on how easy management is, as measured by
the two α parameters respectively.
2.2 Delegation to the manager under perfect information
An alternative to centralization is for the principal to delegate a decision (by assumption the internal
one) to the workplace manager (delegation or decentralization). Under delegation each person
specializes in just one decision task and hence allocates a share of 1 to their respective task.
Delegation may potentially involve a conflict of interest with the manager preferring some action
or effort level, denoted a (from a feasible set A ⊆ [0, 1]) which results in an increase in the principal’s
loss, denoted l(a) with l ≥ 0, l′ < 0 and a disutility to the manager of c(a) > 0 with c′ > 0 and
c′′ > 0. Under perfect information the principal simply writes a contract specifying the optimal a,
denoted a˜ with instantaneous wage equal to c(a˜). In this case, the expected loss for the principal is:
d(1)σ2e + αβd(1)σ
2
i
2
+ l(a˜) + c(a˜) + u. (5)
Comparing the expected loss between centralization and delegation yields the following result.
Proposition 3. There exists a unique threshold σ˜2e (respectively σ˜
2
i ) such that centralization is
optimal for σ2e < σ˜
2
e (respectively σ
2
i < σ˜
2
i ) and delegation is optimal for σ
2
e > σ˜
2
e (respectively σ
2
i >
σ˜2i ). Thus controllable uncertainty, whether external or internal, makes delegation/decentralization
more likely.
Similarly, holding everything else constant, there exist unique thresholds for α and β, such that
centralization is optimal below the threshold and delegation is optimal above the threshold.
Proof. The net per-period loss from decentralization under perfect information, D, (the loss from
decentralization less the loss from centralization) is
D ≡
[
d(1)σ2e + αβd(1)σ
2
i
2
+ l(a˜) + c(a˜) + u
]
−
[
1
2
(d(s∗)σ2e + αβd(1− s∗)σ2i ) + u
]
(6)
Note D is an affine function of σ2e with a slope of (d(1)−d(s∗))/2 < 0 since s∗ < 1 when σ2i > 0 and
d′ < 0. It follows that D = 0 (and hence the single crossing property holds) for a unique value of
σ2e . To see that the crossing occurs at a permissible value, that is σˆ
2
e > 0 note that by assumption
D|σ2e=0 = l(a˜) + c(a˜) > 0. (7)
The proof for internal uncertainty is analogous with the observation that αβ(d(1)−d(1−s∗))/2 <
0 since s∗ > 0 when σ2e > 0 and d
′ < 0.
The results for the α and β terms follow immediately from the equivalent way σ2i , α and β enter
the loss functions.
The principal decides to delegate here because the benefit of fast decision making is greater in a
more unstable environment. The greater benefit of speed in decision making is balanced out against
the additional resources of employing another unit of labor in decision making. Greater delay in
reaching a decision, as measured by the α’s is equivalent to a faster changing environment and
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hence also leads to delegation. Thus we might expect workplaces with more complex (or less well
understood) technologies or task environments to be more likely to have delegation.
Greater workplace scale, as it contributes to greater β, makes the additional cost of delegation
more worthwhile making delegation more likely as β for the internal environment increases. Once
decision making is cast as a process taking time and requiring resources then this result, and those
that follow below, flow naturally from standard economic ideas about production. As we will show
three tier hierarchies, moral hazard and economies of scale are all within the gamut of this model.
Our results are quite different from the standard principal agent type approaches applied to
delegation, such as Prendergast (2002) and Dessein (2002), where the use of an agent is assumed
and the analysis is applied to the details of the relationship arising from asymmetric information
problems. In many organizational settings agents are not endowed with critical private information
but rather acquire it due to the position they hold. If position is the cause of agency problems then
in an endogenous organizational design the obvious solution is to do away with the agent altogether
not to write a complex and expensive incentive contract.10 In this way the standard models fail
to explain organizational structure surrounding the principal-agent relationship in commonplace
organizational contexts. The intuitive reason principals utilize subordinate managers (agents) is the
obvious fact that one person cannot do everything. Or to be more precise, and to echo the approach
of our model, one person cannot do everything in a timely fashion.
The model also yields the following relationship between delegation and uncontrollable uncer-
tainty.
Proposition 4. Under full information delegation is independent of the level of uncontrollable
uncertainty, σ2ε .
Proof. From equations (4) and (5) expected per period loss under both centralization and decentral-
ization are independent of σ2ε and hence the decentralization decision is independent of uncontrollable
uncertainty.
Under perfect information the uncontrollable uncertainty is just noise affecting payoffs indepen-
dently of the way in which decision-making is organized and hence has no impact on the decision to
decentralize. We shall see in the next section that under moral hazard uncontrollable uncertainty
can have an indirect role in the decision to decentralize through its impact on the cost of motivating
an agent.
2.3 Extensions
2.3.1 Three tier hierarchy
In the proceeding section we assumed that the principal played the dual roles of senior manager and
owner of the firm. This approach is reasonable to the extent that the senior manager in the firm is
indeed well incentivized, or well selected, so that she acts to maximize profits. In some cases it may
be more appropriate to think of the senior manager as an employee separate from the owner of the
firm. We model this alternative as an extension to our existing model with a three tier hierarchy.
10It is natural to think of a salesman having private information about how hard hard he is working but less natural
to think of every divisional head at Toyota having critical project selection information that was exogenously endowed
by nature rather than by virtue of the position they hold.
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Assume that hierarchical levels are numbered from the top down with the owner at level 1, a senior
manager at level 2 and if delegation is used a junior manager at level 3.
As before, we assume that compared to the principal performing a decision task delegation might
produce an additional equilibrium loss of li on the internal environment and le on the external
environment. For simplicity we further assume that the senior and junior managers are identical so
that it makes no difference to these losses whom the decisions are delegated to: le = li = l ≥ 0.
Furthermore we assume each task is equally onerous so that it makes no difference which task (or
combination of tasks) are performed by which agent to the required equilibrium instantaneous rate
of compensation which we denote w > 0.
In the three tier hierarchy the owner is not active in the ongoing managerial decision-making so
centralization means all the decisions are made by the senior manager. In this case the expected
loss for the principal from centralization is:
d(s∗)σ2e + αβd(1− s∗)σ2i
2
+ 2l + w. (8)
Decentralization in the three tier hierarchy means one task is allocated to each of the managers
giving an expected loss for the principal from decentralization of:
d(1)σ2e + αβd(1)σ
2
i
2
+ 2l + 2w. (9)
Comparing these expected losses gives the following proposition which is the three tier hierarchy
equivalent of Proposition 3.
Proposition 5. For the three tier hierarchy there exists a unique threshold Σ2e (respectively Σ
2
i )
such that centralization is optimal for σ2e < Σ
2
e (respectively σ
2
i < Σ
2
i ) and delegation is optimal for
σ2e > Σ
2
e (respectively σ
2
i > Σ
2
i ). Thus controllable uncertainty, whether external or internal, makes
delegation/decentralization more likely.
Proof. The net per-period loss from decentralization in the three tier case, D3, (the loss from de-
centralization less the loss from centralization) is
D3 ≡
[
d(1)σ2e + αβd(1)σ
2
i
2
+ 2l + 2w
]
−
[
1
2
(d(s∗)σ2e + αβd(1− s∗)σ2i ) + 2l + w
]
(10)
Note D3 is an affine function of σ2e with a slope of (d(1) − d(s∗))/2 < 0 since s∗ < 1 when σ2i > 0
and d′ < 0. It follows that D3 = 0 (and hence the single crossing property holds) for a unique value
of σ2e . To see that the crossing occurs at a permissible value, that is σˆ
2
e > 0 note that by assumption
D3|σ2e=0 = w > 0. (11)
The proof for internal uncertainty is analogous with the observation that αβ(d(1)−d(1−s∗))/2 <
0 since s∗ > 0 when σ2e > 0 and d
′ < 0.
Again we see the basic logic of our approach: delegation aimed at improving the timeliness of
decision-making requires extra managerial resources. The cost of the additional resources is only
justified if the benefit of faster decisions making is significantly great. In our case the benefit of
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being a nimble organization is measured by σ2i and σ
2
e . In reality, the speed of change in a firms
environment is likely to be affected by such processes as increasing competition and globalization
which are considered in section 3.
Qualitatively the two and three tier cases are very similar however the thresholds will vary
because a non-managerial principal means u is replaced by l + w. If the opportunity cost of time
for the senior manager and the principal are similar while l > 0 then the two tier hierarchy would
dominate. Thus our model can be applied to delayering as well as delegation but we do not pursue
that direction further here. Next we consider the impact of asymmetric information on our model.
2.3.2 Incentive contracts under moral hazard
The performance of the manager may depend not just on the unit of labor he is contracted to supply
for decision making but upon the effort a ∈ [0, 1] he exerts. Low effort results in more loss to the
principal described by the function l(a) with l′ < 0, l(0) = ∞, l(1) = 0. The manager’s effort is
costly to the manager and unobservable to the principal so that the manager’s behavior is subject
to moral hazard. For the moral hazard to bind l(a) + εi must also be unobservable as well as its
components. Without an output-based contract the manager will choose zero effort. We assume
that contracting problems, such as risk aversion or limit liability, exist resulting in a second best
contract. Rather than specify a particular contracting model we instead make the following general
assumption.
Assumption 1. Let the contract duration be T . The optimal contract starting at date S implements
a unique effort and wage profile {(a∗t (σε), w∗t (σε))}t=S+Tt=S with da
∗
t
dσε
≤ 0, dw∗tdσε > 0 and
d(l(a∗t )+w
∗
t )
dσε
> 0
for all t.
Bilateral moral hazard in dynamic environments is very involved and the literature has tended
to produce extremely complex optimal contracts which in many cases are not realistic and are not
robust to modeling choices (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005). Our focus here is not on producing a
new set of optimal contract results but rather to draw on the common themes of that literature to
better understand delegation decisions — hence our axiomatic approach through Assumption 1.
Proposition 6. With the optimal moral hazard incentive contract there exists a unique threshold σˆ2e
(respectively σˆ2i ) such that centralization is optimal for σ
2
e < σˆ
2
e (respectively σ
2
i < σˆ
2
i ) and delegation
is optimal for σ2e > σˆ
2
e (respectively σ
2
i > σˆ
2
i ). Thus controllable uncertainty, whether external or
internal, makes delegation/decentralization more likely.
Proof. The net loss from decentralization, D∗, (the loss from decentralization less the loss from
centralization) is
D∗ ≡
[
d(1)σ2e + αβd(1)σ
2
i
2
+ l(a∗) + w∗ + u
]
−
[
1
2
(d(s∗)σ2e + αβd(1− s∗)σ2i ) + u
]
(12)
Note D∗ is an affine function of σ2e with a slope of (d(1) − d(s∗))/2 < 0 since s∗ < 1 when σ2i > 0
and d′ < 0. It follows that D∗ = 0 (and hence the single crossing property holds) for a unique value
of σ2e . To see that the crossing occurs at a permissible value, that is σˆ
2
e > 0 note that by assumption
1
D∗|σ2e=0 = l(a∗) + w∗ > 0. (13)
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The proof for the internal case is analogous with the observation that αβ(d(1)−d(1−s∗))/2 < 0
since s∗ > 0 when σ2e > 0 and d
′ < 0.
Thus faster change in either environment increases the likelihood of decentralization when there
is moral hazard just as it did under full information. The thresholds will in general differ between
the two cases because the noise inherent in moral hazard increases the expected cost of the manager
compared to the full information case. We now examine this informational cost in more detail:
Proposition 7. Increasing uncontrollable uncertainty, σ2ε , makes delegation more unlikely in the
sense that ∂σˆ
2
e
∂σ2ε
> 0 and ∂σˆ
2
i
∂σ2ε
> 0.
Proof. Since D∗ is an affine function of σ2e an increase in its vertical intercept (D
∗|σ2e=0) implies an
increase in its horizontal intercept, σˆ2e . By assumption 1,
d(l(a∗)+w∗)
dσ2ε
> 0 so the vertical intercept of
D∗ is increasing in σ2ε and hence
∂σˆ2e
∂σ2ε
> 0. A equivalent argument holds for ∂σˆ
2
i
∂σ2ε
.
The standard insight from contract theory implies that the better able a principal is to filter
noise out of the manager’s contract the less expensive the manager will become in expectation.11
In our case this means that the more closely payment is related to effort for the agent the more
attractive delegation becomes. This result highlights a negative relationship between uncertainty,
when it takes the form of systemic risk, and delegation through the neglected risk-incentive tradeoff
of standard contract theory.
2.3.3 Multiple workplaces
Many firms have multiple plants and so the choice to delegate a decision (or decisions) is not simply
between one principal and one manager but between a principal and multiple managers. The simplest
extension of our perfect information model to a firm with n plants would be to assume that each of
the plants requires its own internal decision in response to a plant-specific control variable. If the
plant-specific control variables are identical or highly correlated then, as before, a single centralized
decision by the principal could be applied to all plants with only a small loss of local information.
Our extended model is described below.
There are n plants indexed by m = 1, ..., n and each plant has a constant bias of zm from the
common internal Brownian motion µit. Thus the instantaneous loss for plant m at time t is
(xit − µit − zm)2 + εitm. (14)
The values of the biases are unknown to the principal when she makes a decision centrally but
she knows they are iid N(0, σ2z) and are uncorrelated with the evolution of the Brownian motions.
Consider first the expected per period loss (net of managerial resource costs) from centralizing with
one plant:
E[Li] =
1
T
∫ T
0
(tσ2i + σ
2
z)dt (15)
=
σ2jT
2
+ σ2z . (16)
11Applying monotone comparative statics to the standard principal-agent model Holden (2008) shows ‘better in-
formation’ lowers expected remuneration in very general settings.
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Summing over the n plants gives the steady state per-period expected loss from centralization:
1
2
(d(s∗)σ2e + nαβd(1− s∗)σ2i ) + nσ2z + u. (17)
Analogous to our previous analysis, an alternative to centralization would be to delegate the
internal decision relating to each plant to the manager of that plant. Absent moral hazard each
plant manager acts optimally using their local information so that the loss measured by σ2z vanishes.
However, delegation will incur n times more labour related costs than in the single plant case. Hence
the steady state per-period expected loss from decentralization is given by:
d(1)σ2e + nαβd(1)σ
2
i
2
+ nl(a) + nw + u (18)
Centralization has an inherent advantage in terms of economies of scale in the cost of decision-
making. When the loss of local information is relatively unimportant then the economies of scale
will eventually dominate as the following proposition shows. We prove this economies of scale result
for the more general case where nσ2z is replaced by a general function k(n) measuring the extra
loss due to imposing a centralized decision, with k > 0, k′ > 0. Then the steady state per-period
expected loss from centralization is given by:
1
2
(d(s∗)σ2e + nαβd(1− s∗)σ2i ) + k(n) + u. (19)
Proposition 8. If k is concave and k′(n) is small, specifically k′(n) < l(a)+w+[d(1)− d(s∗)]σ2i /2
for all n ≥ 1, then there exists a unique N such that centralization is strictly preferred to decentral-
ization for sufficiently large n (n > N).
Proof. Taking the difference between the loss expressions from equation (18) less equation (19) gives
the net loss from decentralization for a fixed n, denoted Dn:
Dn ≡ [d(1)− d(s∗)] σ
2
e
2
+ n([d(1)− d(s∗)] σ
2
i
2
+ l(a) + w)− k(n), (20)
where D is defined above in equation (10). Now
∂Dn
∂n
= [d(1)− d(s∗)] σ
2
i
2
+ l(a) + w − k′(n) > 0 (21)
with the inequality holding by assumption. Thus Dn is increasing in n for all n in the feasible range
n ≥ 1 and ∂Dn∂n is non-decreasing therefore Dn is increasing without bound. It follows that if Dn ≥ 0
at n = 1 then centralization is preferred for all feasible n, i.e. N = 1. Otherwise, if Dn < 0 at n = 1
then as Dn is increasing without bound it will exceed zero (making centralization strictly preferred)
for some unique value of n say N .
Thus in the simplest multi-plant case, delegation is less likely to occur as the number of plants
increases because the increasing resource costs of delegation eventually dominate. Increasing inter-
plant heterogeneity, as measured by σ2z , reduces the scale economies in decision making because
there is increasing loss of local information. This is expressed formally in our final result:
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Proposition 9. Considered a fixed n in the case where k(n) = nσ2z . If l(a)+w+[d(1)− d(s∗)]σ2i /2 >
0, so that centralization is preferred in the absence of plant heterogeneity, then there exists a unique
level of inter plant heterogeneity, σˆ2z such that centralization is preferred for σ
2
z < σˆ
2
z and decentral-
ization is preferred for σ2z > σˆ
2
z .
Proof. The result follows immediately from equation (21).
This view of a multi-plant firm and its delegation choices is simple but it does illustrate the
importance of economies of scale in decision-making: as long as plants are similar, and profitabil-
ity is not too sensitive to a generic solution to problems, then there can be significant advantages
to centralization. This incentive to centralize is the opposite of the findings of Aghion and Tirole
(1997), who argued that for motivational reasons increasing the number of subordinates performing
independent tasks increases the likelihood of delegation of real decision-making authority, as the
principal has a credible commitment not to interfere. Other prominent approaches to decentral-
ization and delegation such as Prendergast (2002) and Dessein (2002) do not address scale issues.
Taking a broader perspective, the type of activities grouped inside an organization is itself a strategic
choice which is the subject of the literature on the boundaries of the firm. Our preliminary analysis
here suggests that the relationship between managerial decision-making and the boundaries of the
firm may be a fruitful subject for future research.
In addition to avoiding unnecessary replication of the same management tasks, there can be gains
from learning by doing through centralization. Coordination, communication and the introduction
of a middle manager (who frees up the principal for the external decision but is responsible for
the the internal decisions) are just a few of the rich organizational issues suppressed by our simple
analysis. These issues, plus others, may well be important for understanding organizations but they
are not observed in our data set and hence do not feature in our empirical analysis discussed below.
3 Data Set and Variables
We use the Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey 1995 (AWIRS 95) to investigate the
theoretical predictions developed in Section 2. AWIRS 95 is a cross-industry survey (excluding
agriculture, forestry and fishing and defense) of workplaces (that is, plants or establishments) with
20 or more employees. Details of AWIRS 95 are outlined in Appendix B, however it is worth
noting several advantages of the AWIRS 95 data. First, this study — along with Acemoglu et al.
(2007) — is one of the first cross-industry studies of delegation of decision-making using novel and
interesting data. Colombo and Delmastro (2004), for example, in their study of decision-making
focussed on manufacturing industries in Italy. A related study, Guadalupe and Wulf (2007), also use
cross-industry data but they investigate delayering rather than the delegation of decision-making
explicitly. Second, the AWIRS 95 has information related to the key factors of interest, such as
product-market competition, international trade and the unpredictability of product demand. Third,
like the United States and the United Kingdom, and unlike much of continental Europe, Australia
has a relatively flexible labor market, ensuring that the observed results are driven by economic
rather than institutional factors. Further to that, Australia is an open economy, making it a good
choice to study the impact of international trade on the delegation of decision-making.
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3.1 Delegation of decision-making: dependent variable
The survey identifies whether in the last two years prior to the survey is a workplace introduced
some significant, non-routine change, where the possible changes were: new technology; new plant
or equipment; a major reorganization of the workplace; or a change to the work of non-management
employees. For the estimation sample, the left-hand column of Table 1 shows the proportions of
workplaces that implemented the different changes; 54 percent of workplaces implemented technical
change, 30 percent introduced major new plant, machinery or equipment, 71 percent undertook a
major reorganization of the workplace structure and 56 percent of workplaces made major changes
to the work of non-management employees. Approximately 16 percent of the workplaces surveyed
did not implement any of the possible changes.
Table 1: What is significant change?a
Workplace implemented following If a change was made, the change with
type of changeb (n = 570) most significant effect on employeesc
(proportion of workplaces, n = 570)
Technology (not just routine replacement) Technology (not just routine replacement)
306(.537) 107(.188)
Major new plant, machinery or equipment Major new plant, machinery or equipment
(not just routine replacement) (not just routine replacement)
174(.305) 74(.130)
Major reorganization of workplace Major reorganization of workplace
structure structure
403(.707) 249(.437)
Major changes to how non-managerial Major changes to how non-managerial
employees do their work employees do their work
319(.560) 140(.246)
Total number of changes Total
1202 570(1.0)
Notes: a. Source AWIRS 1995. b. The number and proportions (in parentheses) of workplaces that
implemented the specified change in the last two years from the total number of 570 workplaces from
the estimation sample (left-hand column). Multiple changes at a given workplace are possible. c. For
each workplace in the sample, the number (and proportion) of each type of change that had the most
significant effect on employees at that workplace (right-hand column).
Table 1 also shows, in the right-hand column, the change that had the most significant effect on
employees at the workplace.12 In establishments that implemented some change, major reorgani-
zation of the workplace structure was the most significant change for employees in approximately
44 percent of these workplaces; a major change to the work of non-management employees had the
most impact on employees in 25 percent of workplaces that made some significant organizational
change.
Focussing on the change that had the most significant effect on employees at the workplace, we
identify whether the decision to implement the change was made at the workplace (delegation, coded
as 0) or whether the decision was made at a higher level of management in the organization above
12If there was only one change implemented, this change had the most effect on employees. If more than one change
was implemented the general manager was asked to identify the change that ‘has had the most significant effect on
employees here’.
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the workplace (centralization, coded as 1). This is the dependent variable in our estimations. While
details for the construction of this variable are in Appendix B, it is worth noting that in this study
we focus on the location of the unique decision-maker; in this binary hierarchy higher-level managers
in the supervising office could make the decision to implement the change (centralization) or, alter-
natively, the workplace could have made the decision (delegation).13 Independent evidence indicates
that firms choose their structure of supervising office and a separate workplace for reasons that are
independent of the decision we are currently examining. For example, Rossi-Hansberg (2005) and
Aiginger and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) argued that the geographic structure of firms (head supervi-
sory offices and other plants) are driven by technical and operational features such as agglomeration
effects and transport costs.
Several additional points are important here. First, the organization change we examine is a
major decision, rather than routine reinvestment or part of day-to-day operations; that is, we focus
on a single design choice by senior management rather than focussing on a path-dependent slow
institutional adjustment. While circumstances and the structure of the firm matter, it is not plausible
that these choices would be made on the basis that a decision regarding the specific (potentially)
one-off change studied here would be made sometime in the future. Stated in another way, change
management is a separate process from the daily operations and structure of a firm. This is an
advantage of our dependent variable, as compared to more routine decisions used in Colombo and
Delmastro (2004) and Bloom et al. (2007) or using the organization’s choice regarding a profit or cost
center, which is the main measure of delegation of decision-making in Acemoglu et al. (2007) and
Christie et al. (2003). While we do not imply causality in our estimations, considering non-routine
change aids in reducing the potential endogeneity of the independent organization variables and our
decision-making variable. Second, given the decision studied is a major change, it is economically
important to the firm. This means that the decision is unlikely to be randomly allocated without
some attempt to maximize the benefit from the change-management process. The estimation results,
consequently, are instructive to the influences an organization faces in allocating decision-making
rights.14
3.2 Independent variables
Here we introduce the variables used to elucidate the theoretical propositions outlined in Section 2.
Table 2 provides summary statistics for main variables of interest (Table 8 provides details for the
other controls). While it is not possible, as is very often the case, to have a perfect correlation
between the theory and the empirics, there is a strong case to be made that our data captures
important elements of the theoretical model. Broadly, the independent variables are classified as
relating to the external context, the business strategy and the internal context of the workplace.
3.2.1 External context
The key predictions of the theory relate to the costs associated with a slow decision-making process.
The cost of slow decision making relates to the time it takes to implement a new project and how
13We do not impose any structure on the higher-level management in the supervising office or on the internal
structure of the workplace itself, and these could vary between organizations.
14A potential issue with the hand full of other empirical studies on delegation is that the importance to the firm,
or otherwise, of the form of delegation considered is unclear.
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Table 2: Summary statistics of the sample (N = 570)
Variable Mean Std Dev.
Dependent variable
Centralization index .714 .452
External context
Competition .570 .495
Export .186 .389
Import .168 .375
Unpredictable demand .207 .406
Business strategy
Responsiveness to demand .046 .209
Quality .240 .428
Internal context
Workplace size 177.9 282.3
Organization size
< 100 .054 .227
100 – less than 500 .132 .338
500 – less than 1000 .100 .300
1000 – less than 5000 .242 .429
5000 – less than 10000 .086 .281
10000 – less than 20000 .102 .303
> 20000 .284 .451
No. of other workplaces
in org. producing the same
output
0 other .102 .303
1 other .032 .175
2-5 other .170 .376
6-10 other .114 .318
11-50 other .182 .387
51-100 other .084 .278
> 100 other .316 .465
High productive workplace .451 .498
Workplace implemented technical change .188 .391
Workplace implemented new plant or machinery .130 .336
Workplace implemented reorganization .437 .496
Workplace implemented change work of employees .246 .431
Notes: a. Source AWIRS 95.
rapidly the state of the world is changing, represented by the variances of the internal and external
control variables. These variances, and the cost of delay, is likely to be increasing in the level of
competition in the product market. The theory presented here predicts that an increase in the
cost of delay increases the likelihood of delegation. Empirically, this translates to a prediction that
competition will be associated with higher costs of delaying a decision, and hence a higher probability
of decentralization. It is worth noting that rather than the traditional model of perfect competition,
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we are thinking of competition manifesting itself in a process of creative destruction, as in the
endogenous growth models of Aghion and Howitt (1992, Chapter 7), or in time-based competition
models such as Souza (2002) in which firms introduce new products in order to capture market
share.15 In these competitive environments the greater the number of sources of advancement the
more likely a firm will get left behind if it too does not innovate (less market share, profit, etc). In this
way, in a highly competitive environment there is an additional cost of a protracted decision-making
process. Guadalupe and Wulf (2007) hold a similar belief, arguing that competition increases the
need for timely decisions that make better use of local knowledge. For example, Guadalupe and Wulf
(2007, page 7) suggest ‘we expect intensified competition to increase the value of innovation and
quick decisions ... [f]irms may delegate more decision-making to division managers (i.e. specialists
with local expertise)’.
AWIRS 95 contains information relating to the level of product market competition the workplace
faces. After statistical testing we utilize as a measure of product market competition, a dummy
variable with 1 indicating moderate, strong or intense competition and 0 otherwise, representing
limited or some competition.16 Our measure of competition has the advantage that it measures the
manager’s perception of competitive pressure, and it is this perception upon which the firm will base
its choice of who will make the decision, rather than proxies of market competition such as measures
of concentration or other competition indices.17
We also consider whether or not a workplace exports some of its output. Selling in international
markets involves discovering relevant information in a least two separate markets (the domestic
and foreign market). This could accentuate the informational requirement regarding the external
environment, potentially increasing the cost involved with centralized decision-making. Based on our
model, we predict that being an exporter will be associated with delegation. To this end, a dummy
variable was created taking on a value of 1 for exporters and 0 otherwise. Similarly, we generated
a dummy variable if a workplace faces import competition (1 for workplaces that faced import
competition and 0 otherwise). The relationship between these two variables and decision making is
potentially different; exporting requires information about at least one overseas market and perhaps
many, whereas import competition may simply mean greater competition in the domestic market.
This suggests that import competition need not have any additional effects aside from the increase
in competition, which is already accounted for via the product market competition variable.
The theoretical model suggested that an increase in uncontrollable uncertainty makes delegation
less likely, as greater uncertainty increases the subordinate’s expected compensation. Given this
hypothesis, we include a dummy variable to indicate when product market demand for the workplace
is unpredictable; the dummy variable takes on a value of 1 if product market demand is unpredictable
and 0 otherwise.
Again, while we do not make any conclusions about causality from our empirical results, given
that our decision is a significant change and not a routine decision, it is reasonable to assume a
significant degree of exogeneity of these product market variables with respect to the dependent
15Also see the literature on industry clock speed, such as Mendelson (2000) and Souza et al. (2004).
16The possible responses were: intense competition; strong competition; moderate; some competition; and limited
competition. Estimates obtained using a dummy variable for each of the different levels of competition indicated that
there was no statistical difference between the estimated coefficients for moderate, strong or intense competition.
17See Tirole (1988, Chapter 5), for example, for a discussion of the lack of a clear relationship between concentration
and product-market competition.
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variable of the centralization of decision making.
3.3 Business strategy
While there has been little theoretical work on the issue, the management literature has suggested
that the business strategies pursued by a firm could influence its organizational structure (see Brick-
ley et al. (2007) and Porter (1985), for example). In the survey, each workplace was asked about
their business strategy, in particular whether the most crucial element for competitive success for
the workplace’s major product or service depended on: the quality of their output; the workplace’s
responsiveness to customers; the price of the output. Dummy variables were created for the strate-
gies of quality and responsiveness to customers, respectively, representing the so called ‘high road’
business strategy that emphasizes quality and customer service, as opposed to a focus on cost (and
price) minimization (Osterman, 1994).
3.4 Internal context
In the estimates we include several key organizational characteristics as controls. First, we include
variables for the size of the workplace in terms of the number of employees at that establishment.
Also, seven dummy variables represent the different category levels for organization size in terms
of employees to which the workplace belongs, ranging from less than 100 to a dummy variable for
organizations that are 20 000 employees or more. To the extent that they are determined by day-to-
day production requirements, these internal organization variables will be exogenous with respect
to the decision-making process surrounding the implementation of a non-routine change.
Section 2.3.3 predicted that as the number of plants performing the same task increased, the
likelihood that delegation would be adopted fell. In a similar manner to Colombo and Delmastro
(2004), we have information about how many other workplaces in the organization produce the same
product. Using the default of no other workplaces in the organization producing the same product,
dummies were created for the surveyed categories: 1 other workplace producing the same output;
2-5 workplaces producing a similar product; 6-10 other workplaces; 11-50 other workplaces; 51-100
workplaces; and more than 100 workplaces producing a similar product.
Acemoglu et al. (2007) found that the delegation was associated with close proximity to the
productivity frontier in that industry. We include a variable for workplaces that have self-identified
as being of high productivity relative to other workplaces in their industry (coded as 1 and 0
otherwise). As well as providing an important control, this allows us to reexamine their result using
alternative data.
The decision being investigated here is concerned with a significant change or innovation that was
implemented. There are four possible types of innovation: technical change; new plant machinery
or equipment (that is not just routine replacements); or a reorganization of the workplace or change
in the work of non-management employees. A dummy variable is created for each of the types of
change when it was the most significant for employees, with technical change used as the omitted
category.
Dummy variables were constructed for industry at the one-digit level. Dummy variables for the
main occupational group at a workplace were also constructed.
Table 3 provides a summary of our empirical predictions.
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Table 3: Empirical predictions from theoretical results
Independent variable Predicted effect on decision-making
External context
Competition Delegation
Export Delegation
Import Delegation
Unpredictability of demand Centralization
Internal context
Workplace size Delegation
No. other workplaces producing same output Centralization
Complex work environment Delegation
Notes: See Propositions 1-9 in section 2.
Table 4: Centralization of decision-making with respect to the external context?a
External context Mean of centralizationb Correlationc
Competitiond −0.142
No 0.788∗∗∗
Yes 0.658∗∗∗
Exporte −0.236
No 0.765∗∗∗
Yes 0.491∗∗∗
Importf −0.130
No 0.741∗∗∗
Yes 0.583∗∗∗
Unpredictable demandg 0.017
No 0.710
Yes 0.729
Notes: a. Source AWIRS 1995. For the centralization (of decision-making) index, a difference-in-means
test was conducted with respect to each external context variables. *** Significant at 1% level, **
significant at 5% level, * significant at 10 % level. b. The decision to implement the change that had
the most significant effect on employees at the workplace was decentralized if made at the workplace and
centralized if made by higher levels of management. Multiple changes at a given workplace are possible.
c. Correlation between centralization (of decision-making) index and the respective context variable.
d. Competition is Yes (equal to 1) if the workplace faces moderate, strong or intense product-market
competition, and No (0) otherwise. e. A workplace exports some of its product (Yes, coded as 1) or No
otherwise (0). f. A workplace facing import competition coded as Yes (1) or No (0) otherwise. g. A
workplace with unpredictable product-market demand is coded as Yes (1) or No (0) otherwise.
4 Empirical Results
Table 2 shows the list of variables of interest and their summary statistics for the sample used
in the estimations.18 Details of the sample are provided in Appendix B. In summary, we focus
on workplaces that: implemented a major change in the previous 2 years; have a higher-level of
management (hence are part of a larger organization); and have uniquely identified a decision maker
for the implemented change. This produces a sample size of 570 workplaces for the basic estimations.
18Table 8 for the additional control variables.
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The dependent variable in this study is the centralization of decision-making variable. Table 4
shows some interesting relationships between this decision-making variable and the key control vari-
ables. The table shows the centralization of decision-making variable is significantly lower (indicating
more decentralization) for workplaces with a competitive product market than those that face lim-
ited competition; the difference-in-means test was significant at the 1 % level. The centralization of
decision-making variable was also significantly lower for exporting workplaces than the workplace
that did not export and for workplaces that faced import competition as compared with workplaces
that did not face import competition (again, both of these differences in means were significantly at
the 1 % level). The decision-making index was higher (centralization) for workplaces facing unpre-
dictable demand, however this difference was not statistically significant. The table also presents
the correlation between the decision-making variable and the context variables.
The theoretical predictions are largely supported by the simple univariate analysis. To investigate
more deeply we now turn to multivariate analysis. For our multivariate analysis, we estimate a probit
model of the probability that an organization decentralizes this decision as a function of the internal
and product-market factors outlined above.19
To begin with we estimated the probability of centralized decision making using the full set
of independent variables (Model 1), for which the coefficients of interest are outlined in the first
column of Table 5.20 It is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the industry dummy variables
(and the business-strategy variables discussed below) are jointly insignificant (χ2(12) = 13.11),
so Model II was estimated without the industry dummies. Further, from Model I a joint test that
the industry dummies, the business-strategy variables (detailed below) and the occupational dummy
variables (with the exception of the professional dummy variable) are equal to zero cannot be rejected
(χ2(17) = 17.31). Following this, Model III does not include industry dummy variables, the main
occupation group at the workplace (with the exception of the professional category dummy variable)
and the business-strategy variables. From the results of the three models outlined in Table 5, it is
evident that the coefficients and their levels of significance are relatively stable between the different
specifications. Given these similarities, we will focus on Model II. It is notable from Model III,
however, that if the main group of employees at a workplace are professional, the decision is more
likely to be decentralized to the workplace (significant at the 5 percent level for Model III). One
interpretation of this result is that the activities undertaken by professionals are particularly complex
making change decisions more involved in workplaces dominated by this occupational group.
4.1 Business strategy
Firms can follow several different business strategies in the pursuit of success. As noted above, it is
conceivable that firms pursuing cost/price minimizing objectives might implement different decision-
making structure to firms that emphasize quality and customer service. However, in our estimates
the coefficients for both business strategy dummy variables denoting strategies that emphasized
quality and responsiveness to consumers were not statistically significant, and the hypothesis that
19Define centralization of the decision to be c = 1 and decentralization as c = 0. Letting X be the independent
regressors and β′ the vector of coefficients to be estimated, the latent variable y can be expressed as y = β′X + ε,
where ε is an error term normally distributed. The probit can then estimated as Prob(c = 1) = Φ(β′X) and
Prob(c = 0) = 1− Φ(β′X), where Φ(.) is the standard cumulative normal.
20The other coefficients, such as the industry dummy variables, the professional occupation dummy and the type
of change coefficients are outlined in Table 9 in Appendix A.
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Table 5: Centralization of decision-making: probit coefficients (standard errors in parentheses)a
Model I Model II Model III
Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
External context
Competition -.650* (.344) -.728** (.334) -.741** (.332)
Export -.575** (.238) -.516** (.220) -.504** (.206)
Import .202 (.227) .115 (.210) .087 (.207)
Unpredictable demand .382** (.179) .330* (.169) .347** (.164)
Business strategy
Responsiveness to demand .110 (.359) - -
Quality -.048 (.183) - -
Internal context
Workplace size*1000 -.558** (.251) -.473* (.242) -.484** (.238)
Organization size
100 – less than 500 1.032*** (.330) .978*** (.323) 1.015*** (.322)
500 – less than 1000 1.324*** (.350) 1.249*** (.341) 1.256*** (.340)
1000 – less than 5000 1.078*** (.328) 1.086*** (.319) 1.114*** (.317)
5000 – less than 10000 .934** (.386) .940** (.377) .958*** (.374)
10000 – less than 20000 1.778*** (.393) 1.706*** (.384) 1.732*** (.383)
> 20000 2.156*** (.384) 2.152*** (.366) 2.199*** (.365)
No. of other workplaces
in org. producing the same
output
1 other .506 (.398) .527 (.389) .567 (.385)
2-5 other .697*** (.248) .723*** (.241) .748*** (.239)
6-10 other .307 (.275) .409 (.263) .415 (.260)
11-50 other .560** (.271) .562** (.253) .570** (.251)
51-100 other .859** (.354) .859** (.337) .868*** (.334)
> 100 other .575* (.301) .580** (.283) .608** (.278)
High productive workplace -.229* (.133) -.235* (.130) -.234* (.129)
Other variables
Industry Yes No No
Main occupations Yes** Yes No
Prof occ (only) - - Yes**
Type of change Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Constant Yes Yes Yes
Log likelihood -248.3 -255.9 -257.6
Pseudo R2 0.272 0.250 0.245
No. of obs 570 570 570
Notes: a. *** Significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10 % level.
they are jointly equal to zero cannot be rejected (along with the industry and occupation dummies).
Consequently, these two business-strategy variables are not included in Models II and III.
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Table 6: Marginal effects from probit of decentralization of decision-making (Model II)
Marginal Effects
External context
Competitiona -.230
Exporta -.184
Unpredictable demanda .102
Internal context
Workplace size(*1000)a -.156
Organization size
100 – less than 500d .374
500 – less than 1000b .463
1000 – less than 5000b .412
5000 – less than 10000b .362
10000 – less than 20000b .573
> 20000b .635
No. of other workplaces
in org producing the same
outputc
1 other .206
2-5 other .274
6-10 other .161
11-50 other .218
51-100 other .317
> 100 other .224
High productive workplacea -.078
Notes: (a) Marginal effects calculated for an organization of 1000-5000 employ-
ees with 2-5 other workplaces performing the same task; all other variables set
to their means. Marginal effects for discrete variables calculated for a change
from 0 to 1. (b) Marginal effects calculated for an organization with 2-5 other
workplaces performing the same task with a default of an organization with 0
to 100 employees; all other variables set to means. Marginal effects for discrete
variables calculated for a change from 0 to 1. (c) Marginal effects calculated for
an organization of 1000-5000 employees with a default of no other workplaces
performing the same task; all other variables set to means. Marginal effects for
discrete variables calculated for a change from 0 to 1. (d) Marginal effects cal-
culated for an organization with 2-5 other workplaces performing the same task
with a default of an organization with 0 to 100 employees and the workplace
size set to 30 employees; all other variables set to means. Marginal effects for
discrete variables calculated for a change from 0 to 1.
4.2 External context
The empirical estimates show that higher levels of competition are associated with an increased
likelihood of decentralization. From Table 5, workplaces that face moderate, strong or intense
product-market competition are more likely to decentralize their decision-making as compared with
workplaces that face limited or some competition. These results were significant at the 5 percent
level in Model II and Model III. The marginal effects, displayed in Table 6, show that a 23 percentage
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point increase in the probability of decentralization for workplaces facing moderate, strong or intense
product-market competition compared with workplaces that do not face such competitive pressures.
To the extent that competition increases the cost of a slow decision-making process, this result is
consistent with the theoretical predictions of the theory presented above and is quite large.
Turning to international competition, workplaces that export some of their output are more
likely to have decentralized decision-making; the coefficient on the export dummy was significant
at the 5 percent level in Model II. Moreover, an exporting workplace has a 18 percentage point
increase in the probability that decision-making is decentralized compared with a workplaces that
sold exclusively in the domestic market (Table 6). Notably, however, the coefficient on the import-
competition dummy variable was not statistically significant. While exporting places additional
informational requirements on the workplace, imports do not necessarily involve any additional in-
formation requirements; rather, imports could act merely to increase product-market competition.
This is consistent with our empirical finding that imports are positively correlated with decentral-
ization (Table 4), but that this relationship is not statistically significant in the multivariate analysis
once product-market competition is included as a separate variable.
Prendergast (2002) suggested a positive relationship could exist between uncertainty and the use
of output-based incentives. Our model in section 2 reestablishes the traditional negative relationship
between systemic (uncontrollable) uncertainty and the use of incentives, by allowing the principal
the option to centralize the performance of the internal decision (task). This follows, as an increase
in uncontrollable uncertainty increases the expected cost of the subordinate’s remuneration, making
delegation less likely. Our empirical finding – that workplaces with unpredictable product demand
were more likely to centralize decision making to higher levels of management – is consistent with
this prediction.
4.3 Internal context
First, decentralization is associated with an increase in workplace size; the coefficient for workplace
size was negative and was significant at the 5 percent level in Model II. This indicates, from the
marginal effects in Table 6, an increase in the workplace size by 1000 employees increases the
probability that the decision was decentralized to the workplace by 17 percentage points. This
result is consistent with the theoretical model; the larger the size of the workplace, the more likely
that there is a higher cost of delay from not implementing an up-to-date (internal) decision.
Second, taking workplaces that belong to organizations of less than 100 workers as the default,
an increase in the size of an organization is associated with higher levels of centralization. The size
of the coefficients, and the marginal effects in Table 6, were typically increasing in the organization
size. All of these organization size coefficients were significant at the 1 percent level in Model II.
Third, overall, an increase in the number of workplaces performing the same task is associated
with an increased probability of centralized decision-making. Tables 5 and 6 display these coeffi-
cients and marginal effects respectively. For example, there is a 27 percentage point increase in the
probability that the decision to implement the change is centralized if there are 2-5 other workplaces
performing a similar task relative to an organization with no other workplaces performing the task
(the coefficient significant at the 1 percent level). A similar result applies when there are 11-50
other workplaces (significant at the 5 percent level), 51-100 other workplaces (5 percent level of
23
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 1 2 to  5 6 to  10 11 to  50 51 to
100
> 100
Number of other workplaces making same 
product
Probability of 
centralization
Predicted Pr
95% CI
95% CI
 
Figure 1: Impact on the predicted probability of centralization from a change in the number of
workplaces performing the same task
significance) or more than 100 other workplaces (1 percent level significance) performing a similar
task, the exception being the insignificance of the coefficient for the 6-10 other workplaces dummy
variable. While there is an increase overall, it is notable that there is a non-monotonic relationship
between the increase in the number of other workplaces and the probability of centralization. This is
reflected in the size of the marginal effects for the successive dummy variables as well as the predicted
probability of centralization as the number of workplaces is altered, illustrated in Figure 2.
The result that an increase in the number of workplaces performing the same task is associ-
ated with centralization accords with the empirical findings of Colombo and Delmastro (2004) for
manufacturing firms. Furthermore, this finding is consistent with the multi-plant extension to the
model in Section 2 that showed that when the economies-of-scale advantages that makes delegation
less likely. Other factors such as coordination costs could also play a role in this result but are not
reported in our data.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that a decision regarding a change in the work of non-management
employees was more likely to be decentralized, relative to the default of a non-routine adoption of a
technical change, and this was significant at the 1 percent level (in Model II, Table 9). In Colombo
and Delmastro (2004), labor-related decisions were more likely to be decentralized, while capital-
related decisions tended to be centralized. Our finding suggest a similar story with respect to
labor-related decision.
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5 Extensions
Here we consider several extensions to Model II. First, we investigate the impact on the estimates
of the inclusion of various human resource management (HRM) techniques (Section 5.1). Second,
we explore the robustness of our estimates by considering: sample selection in regards to those
workplaces that did (and did not) innovate (Section 5.2); and an alternative specification of the
dependent variable (Section 5.3).
5.1 Human resource management and decentralized decision-making
Previous studies have shown that human resource management (HRM) techniques, such as bonuses,
training and staff appraisals are often implemented in combination on the shop floor, and can affect
firm productivity (Bartel et al., 2004; Ichiowski et al., 1997; Osterman, 1994). In this section we
explore the relationship between certain HRM techniques and decentralization of decision-making
in organizations, focusing on several key HRM techniques, namely: the use of bonuses; training; the
use of total quality management techniques (TQM); staff appraisals; whether the workplace had a
skills audit of employees and the interaction between the presence of a bonus and staff appraisals
To do this we include these additional HRM variables into Model II. The estimated coefficients
and marginal effects are presented in Table 5.1 and Table 10 respectively. They show that the use
of bonuses by a workplace (on their own) are associated with decentralization of decision-making
and this is significant at the 5 percent level. Taking into account the interaction term outlined
below, the use of a bonus by a workplace is associated with a 13 percentage point increase in the
probability of decentralization (Table 10). The coefficient on the staff-appraisal dummy variable was
not significant. An interaction term between the presence of staff appraisals and the use of bonuses
was also included in the estimates, but it was not statistically significant. No significant relationship
was found between training of employees and the allocation of the decision. The coefficient for the
use of a skillaudit by a workplace, on the other hand, was significant at the 1 percent level; use of a
skillaudit was associated with a 16 percentage point increase in probability that decision-making was
centralized. One possible interpretation for this result is that if a skillaudit increases the information
higher levels of management have about a workplace this may allow upper-level managers to be in
a better position to make effective centralized decisions.
Finally, the coefficients on the external and internal context variables from the basic model were
not altered substantially by the inclusion of the HRM variables into the estimation, suggesting that
our main results outlined above are robust to the inclusion of HRM techniques in the estimations.
5.2 Sample selection
We study the level in an organization’s hierarchy a decision to implement a workplace innovation
was made. It is possible that there is a sample selection bias between workplaces that did not
implement any change and those that did. Following Wynand and van Praag (1981), to correct for
any possible sample selectivity we estimated a probit model with sample selection.21 The sample-
selection equation estimated is: (1) did the workplace implement a major change in the last two
years or not; (2) if a change did occur, given change occurred, was the decision centralized or
21Also see Greene (1997).
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Table 7: Marginal effects for probit model with HRM variables (N = 570)
Marginal Effects
External context
Competitiona -.263
Exporta -.201
Unpredictable demanda .093
Internal context
Workplace size(*1000)a -.148
Organization size
100 – less than 500d .404
500 – less than 1000d .461
1000 – less than 5000b .432
5000 – less than 10000b .382
10000 – less than 20000b .584
> 20000b .639
Number of other workplaces
in organization producing the same
outputc
1 other .252
2-5 other .305
6-10 other .164
11-50 other .233
51-100 other .313
> 100 other .225
High productive workplacea -.086
Human resource management
Bonusesa -.127
TQMa -.073
Traininga -.017
Skill audita .148
Staff appraisala .087
Notes: (a) Marginal effects calculated for an organization of 1000-5000 employ-
ees with 2-5 other workplaces performing the same task; all other variables set
to their means. Marginal effects for discrete variables calculated for a change
from 0 to 1. (b) Marginal effects calculated for an organization with 2-5 other
workplaces performing the same task with a default of an organization with 0
to 100 employees; all other variables set to means. Marginal effects for discrete
variables calculated for a change from 0 to 1. (c) Marginal effects calculated for
an organization of 1000-5000 employees with a default of no other workplaces
performing the same task; all other variables set to means. Marginal effects for
discrete variables calculated for a change from 0 to 1. (d) Marginal effects cal-
culated for an organization with 2-5 other workplaces performing the same task
with a default of an organization with 0 to 100 employees and a workplace size
of 30; all other variables set to means. Marginal effects for discrete variables
calculated for a change from 0 to 1.
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decentralized. The instruments for the sample selection equation are: the age of the workplace; a
dummy variable whether product-market demand is expanding or not; a dummy is product-market
demand is contracting; and industry dummies. The centralization of decision-making equation is
as in Model II with the inclusion of the HRM variables, as in Section 5.1. These estimations are
outline in Tables 11 and 12; the hypothesis that of two independent equations (no significant sample-
selection bias) cannot be rejected (χ2(1) = 0.16). Further, the estimated coefficients for the variables
of interest are very similar to the basic estimates presented in above.
5.3 Alternative specifications
Thus far we have considered a binary measure of who makes the decision; as noted previously,
decentralization was defined as when the unique decision maker was located at the workplace (coded
as 0) or the decision was centralized if it was made at a higher level of management (coded as 1).
In this section we investigate decentralization using an alternative measure.
In AWIRS 95, the general manager was asked whether the decision was made by: higher levels
of management beyond this workplace; senior workplace managers; other workplace managers here;
and employees likely to be affected at this workplace. From this it is possible to construct a four-level
hierarchy, were the unique decision maker could be located at: (1) higher-levels of management; (2)
senior workplace managers at the workplace; (3) other workplace managers (at the workplace); (4)
or the workplace employees likely to be affected by the change. The index used previously collapses
all the decisions made at the workplace (levels 2, 3, and 4) into one group (decentralization) because
very few decisions are made by either other managers or by employees (levels 3 and 4).22 However,
to ensure that this simplification is appropriate, we estimate an ordered probit using this four-level
decision-making hierarchy for the explanatory variables in Model II. The results are displayed in
Table 13. The results demonstrate that there is little difference in terms of the signs and significance
of the estimated coefficients of interest between this model and the basic model (shown in Table 5).
Finally, we estimate Model II using a linear probability and a logit model (not shown) and obtain
very similar results.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper developed a theoretical model of delegation that emphasized, for the first time, the cost
of slow decision-making due to the changing environment when the principal and agent have differing
incentives. When there was greater uncertainty about the appropriate decisions to implement, the
principal would be more likely to delegate one of the decision to an agent to increase the throughput
of decisions, thus reducing the loss associated with a slower (centralized) decision-making process.
On the other hand, when systemic uncertainty increased, the expected cost of delegation would
also increase as the moral hazard compensation scheme would become more costly; consequently
greater environment uncertainty decreased the likelihood of delegation. The economies of centralizing
decision-making were also addressed. We showed that with multiple plants (and hence multiple
decisions to be made), the principal would be more likely to centralize, provided the decisions were
22For the estimation sample, the numbers of decisions made at the four levels were 407 by higher management, 151
by senior workplace managers, 8 by other managers and 4 by employees affected respectively (total sample size 570
workplaces).
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relatively similar, to avoid the duplication of managerial costs that would arise. Several other
predictions were derived. For example: an increase in the complexity of the internal environment
increased the likelihood of delegation; and delegation is also more likely the more important the
decision (the bigger the scale of the workplace).
The second contribution in this paper is our novel empirical results. Our study of who makes
a big (non-routine) decision provides a completely new perspective on delegation compared to the
contemporaneous studies that examine operational decisions, delayering and the choice of profit or
cost centers. Our empirical results, while not implying causality, are consistent with our theoretical
predictions: for example, product market competition and exporting is associated with delegation
while a centralization of decision making authority is more likely when there is demand uncertainty.
Together, our theoretical and empirical results make an important point; the external (or product-
market) environment matters, just as much as the internal environment, for firm design. This
suggests a need for ongoing research connecting the characteristics of the product market to a firm’s
internal architecture, including its allocation of decision-making authority. While recent papers, such
as Meagher et al. (2004), Alonso et al. (2008), Meagher and Wang (2008) and the model presented
here, are making steps towards an integrated approach, this remains an important area for future
research.
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Appendix A: Tables
Table 8: (Table 2 cont.) Summary statistics: industry, profession and other variablesa
Variable Mean Std Dev.
Industry
Manufacturing .158 .365
Electricity, gas and water .047 .213
Construction .023 .149
Transport .053 .223
Business services .170 .376
Retail .126 .332
Wholesale .035 .184
Arts .035 .184
Other industries .058 .234
Accommodation .028 .165
Government administration, health or education .232 .422
Profession of main group of employees
Laborers .142 .349
Plant operators .154 .362
Tradesperson .084 .278
Sales .223 .416
Clerks .105 .307
Professionals .165 .371
Para-professionals .126 .332
Other variables
Age of workplace
0 – 5 years .049 .216
5 – 10 years .086 .281
10 – 20 years .202 .402
20 – 50 years .346 .476
> 50 years .316 .465
Demand expanding .595 .491
Demand Contracting .089 .286
Notes: a. Sources AWIRS 95.
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Table 9: (Table 5 cont.) Additional probit coefficients for centralization of decision-making (standard
errors in parentheses)
Model I Model II Model III
External context Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
No competition info DV -.216 (.393) -.182 (.349) -.196 (.344)
No export info DV -.072 (.852) -.041 .(814) -.017 (.806)
No import info DV -.003 (.879) -.049 (.838) -.112 (.831)
Internal context
Plant equipment change -.285 (.281) -.227 (.268) -.278 (.260)
Reorganization of workplace -.381* (.222) -.310 (.212) -.347* (.210)
Change of employee work -.851*** (.230) -.778*** (.220) -.81*** (.217)
Industry and profession
Mining .108 (.448) - -
Manufacturing -.417 (.348) - -
Electricity, gas & water .109 (.395) - -
Construction -.669 (.443) - -
Transport -.706* (.379) - -
Business services -.132 (.276) - -
Retail -.587* (.356) - -
Wholesale -.665 (.425) - -
Arts -.361 (.381) - -
Other -.691** (.346) - -
Accommodation -.917** (.453) - -
Laborer .385 (.286) .240 (.267) -
Plant operator -.016 (.291) -.143 (.263) -
Sales .350 (.327) .142 (.272) -
Clerk -.006 (.341) .032 (.298) -
Paraprofessional .0577 (.360) -.021 (.310) -
Professional -.585* (.332) -.420 (.280) -.464** (.188)
No. of obs 570 570 570
Notes: *** Significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10 % level;
Tradesperson omitted occupation; government, health and education omitted industry.
Tradesperson omitted occupation; government, health and education omitted industry.
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Table 10: Centralization of decision-making with HRM for Model II probit coefficients (standard
errors in parentheses)a
Model II
External context Coeff SE
Competition -.897** (.353)
Export -.534** (.228)
Import .035 (.216)
Unpredictable demand .323* (.175)
Internal context
Workplace size -.495* (.252)
Organization size
100 – less than 500 1.075*** (.334)
500 – less than 1000 1.270*** (.348)
1000 – less than 5000 1.151*** (.330)
5000 – less than 10000 1.000*** (.387)
10000 – less than 20000 1.798*** (.393)
> 20000 2.285*** (.378)
No. of other workplaces
in org producing the same
output
1 other .658* (.412)
2-5 other .819*** (.247)
6-10 other .416 (.272)
11-50 other .604** (.264)
51-100 other .844** (.350)
> 100 other .582** (.290)
High productive workplace -.275** (.134)
Human resource management
Bonuses -.699** (.286)
TQM -.233* (.141)
Training -.056 (.154)
Skill audit .495*** (.154)
Staff appraisal .104 (.179)
Bonus*staff appraisal .433 (.323)
Other variables
Industry No
Main occupations Yes*
Type of change Yes***
Constant Yes
Log Likelihood -244.383
Pseudo R2 0.284
No of Obs 570
Notes: a. *** Significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at
10 % level.
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Table 11: Probit coefficients with sample selection (standard errors in parentheses)
Implement change Centralization
(Selection equation)
Coeff SE Coeff SE
External context
Competition .243 (.214) -.903*** (.351)
Export .343* (.186) -.604*** (.230)
Import .248 (.176) . 017 (.219)
Unpredictable demand .332** (.146) .303* (.184)
Demand expanding -.239∗∗ (.120) -
Demand contracting -.133 (.179) -
Internal context
Workplace size*1000 -.058 (.191) -.470* (.252)
Organization size
100 – less than 500 .300 (.210) 1.021*** (.368)
500 – less than 1000 .697*** (.247) 1.159*** (.426)
1000 – less than 5000 .871*** (.231) 1.041** (.444)
5000 – less than 10000 .590** (.281) .910** (.447)
10000 – less than 20000 .762*** (.271) 1.700*** (.483)
> 20000 1.151*** (.273) 2.135*** (.544)
Number of other workplaces
in organization producing the
same output
1 other -.581** (.266) .723* (.430)
2-5 other .035 (.200) .810*** (.249)
6-10 other -.095 (.233) .402 (.271)
11-50 other -.006 (.223) .604** (.263)
51-100 other -.039 (.282) .837** (.349)
> 100 other -.169 (.256) .592** (.289)
High productive workplace .1478 (.107) -.284** (.135)
Age of workplace
5 – 10 years .131 (.272) -
1 – 20 years .495* (.257) -
20 – 50 years .299 (.241) -
> 50 years .435* (.251) -
(continued)
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Table 12: Probit coefficients with sample selection continued (Standard errors in parentheses)
Implement change Centralization
(Selection equation)
Coeff SE Coeff SE
Human Resource Management
Bonus .760*** (.269) -.754** (.313)
TQM .056 (.110) -.239* (.141)
Train -.013 (.117) -.051 (.153)
Skillaudit .209* (.120) .467*** (.174)
Staffappraisal .219 (.136) .089 (.189)
Bonus*staffapprasial -.875*** (.293) .495 (.363)
Other variables
Industry Yes No
Main occupation Yes Yes
Type of change No Yes***
Constant Yes*** Yes
Log likelihood
ρb -.217 (0.522)
No. of obs. 793 569
Notes: a. *** Significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10 % level. Tradesperson
omitted occupation; government, health and education omitted industry, Age of workplace 0 − 5 years
. Demand expanding is: 1 if demand for the workplace’s output is expanding; 0 otherwise. Demand
contracting is: 1 if demand for the workplace’s output is contracting; 0 otherwise.
b. ρ: LR test of independent equations (ρ = 0); χ2(1) = 0.16.
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Table 13: Ordered probit results for 4 unique levels of the centralization of decision-making
External context Coeff SE
Competition -.887*** (.342)
Export -.499** (.208)
Import -.032 (.198)
Unpredictable demand .296* (.164)
Internal context
Workplace size*1000 -.355 (.229)
Organization size
100 – less than 500 .658** (.278)
500 – less than 1000 .768*** (.296)
1000 – less than 5000 .748*** (.279)
5000 – less than 10000 .646* (.337)
10000 – less than 20000 1.418*** (.348)
> 20000 1.856*** (.329)
No. other workplaces
in org producing the
same output
1 other .714* (.371)
2-5 other .809*** (.219)
6-10 other .535** (.244)
11-50 other .638*** (.240)
51-100 other .891*** (.333)
> 100 other .561** (.270)
High productive workplace -.272 (.125)
HRM
Bonuses -.522 (.256)
TQM -.249 (.133)
Training -.006 (.142)
Skill audit .443 (.144)
Staff appraisal .075 (.169)
Bonus*staff appraisal .268 (.295)
Other variables
Industry No
Main occupations Yes
Type of change Yes
Cut 1 -2.951 (.542)
Cut 2 -2.494 (.522)
Cut 3 -.527 (.505)
Log likelihood -298.745
Pseudo R2 0.237
No of obs. 570
Notes: *** Significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10
% level. Tradesperson omitted occupation; government, health and education
omitted industry.
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Appendix B: Dataset and Variables Construction
The Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey 1995 (AWIRS 95) contains several comple-
mentary surveys.23 The main survey sampled 2001 workplaces with over 20 employees in all major
ANZSIC divisions across all States and Territories of Australia. This paper makes use of the Gen-
eral Management Questionnaire, which was conducted by personal interview and completed by the
most senior manager at the workplace, and the Employee Relations Management Questionnaire,
conducted by personal interviews with the employee relations manager. Note that in this survey
a workplace (which is an establishment or plant at a particular address) can be part of a larger
organization.
Organization change
The senior manager at each of the establishments surveyed was asked in the General Management
survey, asked ‘which, if any, of the changes listed, happened at this workplace in the last 2 years?
(1) technology (not just routine replacement); (2) Introduction of major new plant, machinery or
equipment (not just routine replacement); (3) Major reorganization of workplace structure (for
example, changing the number of management levels, restructuring whole divisions/sections and so
on); (4) Major changes to how non-managerial employees do their work (for example, changes in the
range of tasks done, changes in the type of work done); or (5) None of the above’ (Question BF1).
If more than one change was implemented the senior workplace manager was asked which change
had the most significant effect on the employees here (Question BF3).
From the change made, or the most significant change in terms of its affect on employees if
more than one change was made, 4 dummy variables for types of change implemented: Technical
change coded 1 if the change was made was technical change, 0 for all other changes; New plant
or machinery coded 1 if the change was made was introducing new plant or machinery, 0 for all
other changes; Reorganization coded 1 if the change was reorganization of workplace or if there
were multiple changes and most important was not specified, 0 for all other changes; Change work of
employees coded 1 if the change was made was change in type of work of non-management employees,
0 for all other changes.
Dependent variable
Centralization index : for the change that most affected the employees, as described above, the gen-
eral manager was asked how involved in the decision to introduce the innovation were: higher levels
of management beyond this workplace; senior workplace managers; other workplace managers here;
and employees likely to be affected at this workplace (question BF7). The possible answer options
were: (1) made the decision; (2) had significant input; (3) were consulted; (4) were informed; (5)
were not informed; and (6) not relevant for this organization. This information was compiled to cre-
ate a hierarchy in which decision-making occurred either: at the workplace (decentralization, coded
as 0); or above the workplace (centralization, coded as 1). That is, the decentralization category
includes when the decision was made by the senior workplace manager, other workplace managers
or employees (0); centralization is when the decision was made by higher levels of management
beyond the workplace (1)the senior workplace manager. We consider only workplaces part of an
organization with multiple workplaces (as there needs to be a higher level of management) and for
workplaces that are owned or controlled by another workplace in the organization (Question BA9).
External context
Competition coded 1 if the senior workplace manager rated the degree of product market competition
strong, intense or moderate and 0 if there was some competition or with limited competition and 0
otherwise; No competition info DV 1 if BC6 missing and 0 otherwise.
23The survey and the data are described in detail in Morehead et al. (1997).
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Export 1 if nature of market for workplace’s major product or service is domestic with some
export or primarily export and 0 otherwise (from question BC3); No export DV coded as 1 if BC3
missing and 0 otherwise.
Import 1 if workplace faces import competition for its major product or service and 0 otherwise
(from question BC4); No import info DV coded as 1 if BC4 missing and 0 otherwise.
Unpredictable demand generated from Question BC10 ‘[g]enerally speaking, is the demand for
your main product or service fairly predictable, or is it largely unpredictable?’ coded (1) if largely
unpredictable and 0 if largely predictable.
Demand expanding 1 if demand for workplace’s major product or service is expanding; 0 if
demand is stable or contracting (Question BC8).
Demand contracting 1 if demand for workplace’s major product or service is contracting; 0 if
demand is stable or expanding (Question BC8).
Business context
Responsiveness to demand coded as 1 if Question BC7 is 1 and 0 otherwise.
Quality coded as 1 if Question BC7 is 2 and 0 otherwise.
Internal context
Size is equal to BB1
Organization size dummy variables for < 100, 500-less than 500, 1000-less than 1000, 1000-less
than 5000, 5000-less than 10000, 10000-less than 20000 and > 20000 from Question BB17.
No. of other workplaces in org producing the same output For 0 other coded 1 if Question BB16
was 1, and 0 if BB16 not 1 (that is, if it was 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 or 7); 1 other coded 1 if Question BB16
was 2, and 0 if BB16 not 2; 2-5 other coded 1 if Question BB16 was 3, and 0 if BB16 not 3; 6-10
other coded 1 if Question BB16 was 4, and 0 if BB16 not 4; 11-50 other coded 1 if Question BB16
was 5, and 0 if BB16 not 5; 51-100 other coded 1 if Question BB16 was 6, and 0 if BB16 not 6; >
100 other coded 1 if Question BB16 was 7, and 0 if BB16 not 7.
High productive is coded 1 if the workplace’s productivity is a lot or a little higher than its major
competitors and 0 otherwise (Question BD12).
Industry dummy variables created from Question BB6
Occupational categories generated from BB4.
Human resource management (HRM) techniques, such as use of bonuses, TQM, training, skill
audits and staff appraisals derived from Question CA17.
Age of workplace dummy variables for 0 – 5 years, 5 – 10 years, 10 – 20 years, 20 – 50 years and
> 50 years generated from Question BB7.
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